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Abstract
In Part I of this two-part paper on confidential communication over wireless channels, we studied
the fundamental security limits of quasi-static fading channels from the point of view of outage secrecy
capacity with perfect and imperfect channel state information. In Part II, we develop a practical secret key
agreement protocol for Gaussian and quasi-static fading wiretap channels. The protocol uses a four-step
procedure to secure communications: establish common randomness via an opportunistic transmission,
perform message reconciliation, establish a common key via privacy amplification, and use of the key.
We introduce a new reconciliation procedure that uses multilevel coding and optimized low density parity
check codes which in some cases comes close to achieving the secrecy capacity limits established in
Part I. Finally, we develop new metrics for assessing average secure key generation rates and show that
our protocol is effective in secure key renewal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Part I of this two-part paper was devoted to the information-theoretic security limits of a wireless
communications scenario with quasi-static fading. The analysis was carried out in terms of outage
probability and outage secrecy capacity, both for perfect and imperfect channel state information. In the
second of this two-part paper we discuss the practical aspects associated with coding and modulation for
the Gaussian and quasi-static fading wiretap channels. Virtually all systems today separate the problems of
reliable and secure communications and provides them in a tandem fashion, where reliable communication
is dealt with at the physical layer and security is provided at a higher layer (e.g. the network, transport or
application layers) after the physical layer has been established. In this paper we show how modern
physical layer tools, such as modulation, multilevel coding (MLC) and error control codes can be
combined with key agreement protocols to, in some cases, come close to the fundamental limits described
in Part I of this paper.
The general problem of physical layer-based coding and modulation schemes for both reliable and
secure communication over Gaussian and fading wiretap channels has not received much attention and
there is no larger framework to draw on, even with the sustained advances in the area coding and
modulation for Gaussian and fading channels [4], [5]. Much of previous work for the wiretap channel
stems from the early work [6] and [7] and studied more extensively by Wei [8]. This work shows how to
encode secret information using cosets of certain linear block codes. More recently, this general notion
has been extended by Thangaraj et al. [9] where it was shown how low density parity check codes can
asymptotically achieve the secrecy capacity for the erasure wiretap channel, and how it can be used to
provide perfectly secret communications at rates below the secrecy capacity for other channels. Thangaraj
et al. [9] also showed how the joint problems of reliability and security interact in a code and how capacity
approaching codes for the reliability problem can be used for reliability and security requirements of the
wiretap channel. Existence of coding schemes for various generalized wiretap channel scenarios has been
proved by several authors recently [10], [11], [12]. In particular, the existence of coding methods based
on LDPC codes has been shown in [12].
Since designing wiretap codes for Gaussian and fading channels appears to be beyond the capabilities of
current coding techniques, we focus on the somewhat easier problem of generating secret keys for secure
communication over wireless channels. The key generation/distribution problem in wiretap channels falls
under the general problem of key generation from correlated source outputs, which has been studied [13],
[14], [15] in an information theoretic context. The objective of secure key distribution is for Alice and
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Bob to agree on a common k-bit key about which Eve’s entropy is maximal. In key distribution, the k bits
can be unknown to Alice before transmission, this is in contrast to secure message communication where
Alice has a k-bit message that she wants to communicate to Bob, we focus only on the former. Powerful
tools such as common randomness, advantage distillation and privacy amplification were developed in
the context of key distribution over wiretap channels ( [15], [16]) and will be discussed, as they form the
basis for much of the practical secret key agreement protocol proposed in this paper. Most of the key
agreement protocols require some level of interactive communication between Alice and Bob to arrive at
a common but secret key [13], where they exchange information by way of a parallel, error-free public
channel between Alice and Bob during the key agreement phase (e.g. [17]). One key advance in this
paper is that we focus exclusively on protocols that require only one-way, feed-forward communication
from Alice to Bob across the noisy wireless channel and there is no need for a noiseless, authenticated
public channel.
A. Our Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Development of a secret key agreement protocol for the Gaussian channel that performs close to
the fundamental secrecy capacity limits (determined in Part I) over a wide range of channel values.
The communication is from the transmitter-to-receiver only and requires no feedback or error-free side
channels.
• Adaptation of the secret key agreement protocol for the Gaussian channel to the quasi-static fading
channel with perfect channel state information. In some cases this protocol comes close to the funda-
mental limits of the wireless fading channels presented in Part I. Again, the communication is from the
transmitter-to-receiver only and requires no feedback or error-free side channels.
• Extension of the secret key agreement protocol for the quasi-static fading channel to the case of
imperfect channel information.
• Development of new security and communication metrics, such as average η-secure throughput and
average η-communication throughput for average secret and non- secret bits, respectively, transmitted per
channel use on the wiretap channel.
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we consider a one-way protocol
for key agreement for the Gaussian channel. In Section III we give a new reconciliation procedure for
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the Gaussian channel that is based on multilevel coding and LDPC codes. In Section IV we extend
this protocol in an opportunistic way to the quasi-static fading channel and show that in some instances
(when both the main and wiretapper’s channel have low SNR) that the protocol comes very close to the
secrecy capacity. We also show how the effect of imperfect channel knowledge on the performance of
the protocol. Finally we provide concluding remarks and next steps.
II. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT OVER GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
As a prelude to the problem of coding for the quasi-static fading wiretap channel, we develop a protocol
for the Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Figure 1.
encoder decoder
decoder
X YM
YW
Bob
Eve
Alice
Gaussian noise N (0, NM)
Gaussian noise N (0, NW )
Fig. 1. The Gaussian wiretap channel.
It is assumed that both channels are discrete time additive Gaussian noise channels with an average
transmitted power constraint of 1 and the noise on Eve’s channel is independent of the noise on the
main channel between Alice and Bob. The noise variances for the main and wiretap channel are denoted
respectively NM and NW . Furthermore we assume that Eve’s wiretapper’s channel is worse than the main
channel, namely NW > NM . This critical assumption is necessary to ensure that the secrecy capacity
is strictly positive [18]. If noiseless feedback is allowed between Bob and Alice, then NM > NW is
permitted and the secrecy capacity can be positive [13], however we consider only the case of one-way,
noisy communications from Alice to Bob and NW > NM . There are a number of practical scenarios
where this assumption is valid, for example radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and readers with
a passive eavesdropper [19].
Although the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel has been fully characterized [18],
designing practical coding schemes is still an open problem. On the other hand, previous results on
secret key agreement by public discussion [13] and privacy amplification [16] naturally suggest a four
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step approach to secure communication over a wiretap channel: randomness sharing, information rec-
onciliation, privacy amplification, secure communication. In this section we show how to adapt these to
the Gaussian channel. The following protocol exploits a more general and more efficient version of the
information reconciliation method of [17] and is shown in Figure 2. Some of the four steps are adapted
directly from previous work and not modified, while others require further development as given later in
the paper.
Generate parities
LDPC-based
reconciliation
Amplification
Privacy
Amplification
Privacy
Alice Bob
Bit mapping
X1, . . . , Xn YM,1, . . . , YM,n
K K
X1, . . . , Xn X1, . . . , Xn
Sharing
Reconciliation
Randomness
Privacy amplification
Final key K
Secure communication
with K
Fig. 2. The four-step procedure for secret key agreement on the Gaussian channel.
1. Randomness sharing. The existence of common information between Alice and Bob is the key
ingredient required for secret key agreement. In a wiretap scenario, Alice can generate this shared
randomness by transmitting a sequence Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn) of n i.i.d. realizations of a discrete random
variable X over the main channel, which will provide Bob and Eve with sequences of correlated
continuous variables Y nM = (YM,1, . . . , YM,n) and Y nW = (YW,1, . . . , YW,n) respectively. In Figure 2
the dotted lines indicate the transmission across the Gaussian channel to Bob (and Eve, not shown here).
Since the amount of secrecy extractable from this common randomness is known to be at least [13]
Smin ≥ I(X;YM )−min (I(X;YW ), I(YM ;YW )) bits/symbols, (1)
the mutual information I(X;YM ) should be maximized and Alice should therefore choose X achieving
the capacity CM = 0.5 log2(1+1/NM ) of the main channel. Matching CM exactly is only possible with
continuous Gaussian random variables, however the set X and the probability mass function of X can
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be optimized so that I(X;YM ) lies within hundredth of bits of the channel capacity CM even with
a discrete distribution. For a fixed number of constellation points Nc = |X |, this optimization can be
performed with the algorithm proposed in [20], however a very good approximation of the optimum
can simply be obtained by expanding a uniformly spaced amplitude shift keying (ASK) constellation
{xi}i=1...Nc =
{
±1,±3, . . . ,±Nc−12
}
by a factor α ∈ R+, and using a Maxwell-Boltzmann probability
distribution
P (X = xi) =
exp
(
−λα2|xi|
2
)
∑
j exp
(
−λα2|xi|
2
) . (2)
Even though I(X;YM ) is not a convex function of α and λ, non-linear programming seems to be
relatively insensitive to the initialization of the optimization. Clearly, Nc should be large enough so that
I(X;YM ) can approach CM within the required precision, its exact choice will be discussed in the
Section III.
2. Information reconciliation [21]. The channel noise introduces discrepancies between Bob’s received
symbols Y nM and Alice’s symbols Xn. The first step is for Bob to estimate Alice’s symbols Xˆn =(
Xˆ1, . . . , Xˆn
)
based on Y nM . The channel noise results in discrepancies in the correlated bit sequences
Xn and Xˆn that Alice and Bob will correct and reconcile before any further processing. This requires
an additional exchange of information between Alice and Bob as shown in Figure 2, which is also made
available to Eve. This situation can be viewed as a special case of source coding with side-information,
where Alice compresses her source Xn and Bob decodes it with the help of correlated side information
Y nM . The Slepian-Wolf theorem [22] yields a lower bound on the total number of bits Mrec which have
to be exchanged:
Mrec ≥ H(X
n|Y nM ) = nH(X|YM ). (3)
Notice that the result of [22] only applies to discrete random variables whereas here YM is continuous.
The variable YM can however be quantized into a discrete random variable Yq such that H(X|Yq)
approaches H(X|YM ) with arbitrary precision, and the Slepian-Wolf Theorem still holds.
Practical reconciliation algorithms will introduce an overhead ǫrec > 0 and require the transmission
of Mrec = nH(X|YM )(1 + ǫrec) additional bits. The reconciliation can also be characterized by its
efficiency β which is defined as
6
β(ǫrec) = 1− ǫrec
H(X|YM )
I(X;YM )
≤ 1. (4)
At the end of the reconciliation step, Alice an Bob share with high probability the common sequence
Xn whose entropy is nrec = nH(X). We will assume that Xn is then compressed into a nrec-bits binary
sequence S. For our application to the Gaussian wiretap channel we use multilevel coding (at Alice) and
multistage (MS) decoding (at Bob) to reconcile and correct the differences between Xˆ and X and this
is discussed in detail in Section III.
3. Privacy amplification [16]. This last operation allows Alice and Bob to extract a secret key from
the binary sequence S. The principle of privacy amplification is to apply a well-chosen compression
function g : {0, 1}nrec → {0, 1}k (k < nrec) to the reconciled bit sequence, such that the eavesdroppers
obtains negligible information about the final k-bit sequence g(S). In practice this can be achieved by
choosing g at random within a universal family of hash functions [23], as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: [16, Corollary 4] Let S ∈ {0, 1}nrec be the random variable representing the bit sequence
shared by Alice and Bob, and let E be the random variable representing the total information available
to the eavesdropper. Let e be a particular realization of E. If the Re´nyi entropy (of order 2) R(S|E = e)
is know to be at least c, and Alice and Bob choose K = G(S) as their secret key, where G is a hash
function chosen at random from a universal family of hash functions G : {0, 1}nrec → {0, 1}k, then
H(K|G,E = e) ≥ k −
2k−c
ln 2
. (5)
The total information available to Eve E consists in the sequence Y nW received during the first stage of
the protocol, as well as the additional bits echanged during reconciliation, represented by the random
variable M . As shown in [24, Theorem 5.2] :
R(S|Y nW = y
n
w,M = m) ≥ R(S|Y
n
W = y
n
w)− log2 |M | − 2s− 2 with probability 1− 2−s. (6)
The quantity log2 |M | represents the number of bits intercepted by Eve during the reconciliation, which
is at most nH(X|Ym)(1 + ǫrec) if she intercepted all the information. Evaluating R(S|Y nW = ynW ) is in
general still difficult, however conditioned on the typicality of the bit sequence [25] R(S|Y nW = ynW ) and
H(S|Y nW = y
n
W ) become equal. Hence if n is large enough, nH(X|YW )−nH(X|YM )(1+ ǫrec)−2s−2
is a good lower bound of R(S|E = e), and choosing
k = nβI(X;YM )− nI(X;YW )− 2s− 2− r0, (7)
guarantees that Eve’s uncertainty on the key is greater than k − 2−r0/ ln 2 with probability 1 − 2−s.
For our protocol in this paper we do not develop anything new, and we use standard families of hash
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functions [23], [26].
4. Secure communication. The secret key generated K = G(S) can finally be used to secure Alice’s
message, using either a one-time pad for perfect secrecy or a standard secret key encryption algorithm
and Eve’s uncertainty H(K|G,E = e) about the key is as close to k as we want as per (5).
III. LDPC CONSTRUCTIONS FOR GAUSSIAN RECONCILIATION
In this section we develop an efficient reconciliation approach for Step 2 of the key agreement. The
reconciliation of binary random variables has been extensively studied and several efficient methods have
been proposed [21], [27], however little attention has been devoted to the practical reconciliation of
non-binary random variables [17]. As stated previously the goal is given a non-binary variable X with
distribution given by Eq. (2) and a random variable YM obtained by sending X through an additive
Gaussian channel with noise variance NM , to generate a minimum amount of (parity) information to be
sent to Bob so that X can be recovered from YM and this additional information.
A. Multilevel LDPC Codes for Slepian-Wolf Compression
We assume here that Alice and Bob have, respectively, access to the outcomes xn = {xi}i=0...n−1 ∈ X n
and yn = {yi}i=0...n−1 ∈ Rn of instances of the random variables XN and Y nM . Alice sould then send
Bob additional information to help him recover xn based on yn, and we can assume without restriction
that Bob recovers a binary description of xn. Since each element of X can be uniquely described by a
m-bit label (m ≥ log2 |X |), we introduce the m labeling functions ℓk : X → {0, 1} (k ∈ {0 . . . m− 1}),
which associate to any element of X the kth bit of its binary label. As suggested in [28], we can then
use the syndromes of {ℓk(xi)}i=0...n−1k=0...m−1 according to a binary code as the additional information sent by
Alice to Bob.
Because of the particular correlation considered here, the reconciliation of X and YM is similar to a
coded modulation scheme, where Alice would transmit her data over a Gaussian channel using a Pulse-
Amplitude-Modulation scheme. Most standard modulation techniques such as Bit Interleaved Coded
Modulation (BICM) [29] or MultiLevel Coding/MultiStage Decoding (MLC/MSD) [30] schemes can
therefore be adapted to reconciliation. In the case of a BICM-like reconciliation, a single syndrome
would be computed based on an interleaved version of the bit sequence {ℓk(xi)}i=0...n−1k=0...m−1, whereas
in the case of MLC/MSD-like reconciliation, the m syndromes of the sub-sequences {ℓk(xi)}i=0...n−1
(k ∈ {0 . . . m− 1}) would be computed successively, as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Principle of MLC/MSD reconciliation in the case m=2.
In what follows we will describe a reconciliation algorithm adapted from the last scheme. This choice
was motivated by the fact that BICM is known to be suboptimal over the Gaussian channel, hence the
reconciliation of the variables X and YM with a BICM-like scheme would always require strictly more
that H(X|YM ) additional bits per symbol. Moreover MLC/MSD is based on several components codes
and therefore offers more flexibility on the code design than BICM.
The proposed reconciliation algorithm is a MLC/MSD-like reconciliation that uses binary LDPC
component codes. Other classes of codes such as Turbo-Codes could be used as well, however LDPC
have already proved their good performance for error-correction and side information coding [31], and
the Belief-Propagation algorithm can easily be generalized to account for the correlation between the
sub-sequences {ℓk(xi)}i=0...n−1 (k ∈ {0 . . . m− 1}). We use the following notations to describe the
algorithm:
• bki = ℓk(xi) (i ∈ {0 . . . n− 1},k ∈ {0 . . . m− 1}),
• c(k) represents the number of check nodes at the kth level (c(k) depends on the rate Rk of the code
used at level k and will be discussed in the next section),
• m
(k,l)
ij denotes the message from a variable node vki (i ∈ {0 . . . n− 1}) to a check node ckj (j ∈
{0 . . . c(k)− 1}) of the kth level at the lth iteration , and similarly m(k,l)ji denotes the message from
a check node ckj to a variable node vki of the kth level at the lth iteration,
• Mki denotes the set of all check nodes connected to the variable node vki of the kth level, and N kj
denotes the set of all variables nodes connected to the check node ckj of the kth level,
• s(c) is the syndrome bit associated to a check node c.
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The m levels are then decoded successively, and the update equations of the messages at the lth
iteration of the belief propagation at a given level k are described below :
∀i ∈ {0 . . . n− 1} , ∀j ∈Mki m
(k,l)
ij =


m
(k,0)
i if l = 0,
m
(k,0)
i +
∑
cp∈Mki rcj
(1− 2s(cp))m
(k,l)
pi
, (8)
∀i ∈ {0 . . . n− 1} , ∀j ∈Mki λ
(k,l)
i =


m
(k,0)
i if l = 0,
m
(k,l)
i,j + (1− 2s(cj))m
(k,l)
ji
, (9)
∀j ∈ {0 . . . c(k)− 1} , ∀i ∈ N kj m
(k,l)
ji = log
1 +
∏
vp∈N kj rvi
tanh
m
(k,l−1)
pj
2
1−
∏
vp∈N kj rvi
tanh
m
(k,l−1)
p,j
2
, (10)
where
m
(k,0)
i = log
∑
xˆ∈X :ℓk(xˆ)=1
p(yi, xˆ) exp

−
∑
p 6=k
(1− ℓp(xˆ))(λ
(p,lmax)
i −m
(p,0)
i )


∑
xˆ∈X :ℓk(xˆ)=0
p(yi, xˆ) exp

−
∑
p 6=k
(1− ℓp(xˆ))(λ
(p,lmax)
i −m
(p,0)
i )


. (11)
If the Tanner graphs of the LDPC component codes are trees, it can be shown that the values λ(k,l)i
converge to the true a posteriori probabilities :
P
[
bki = 1|b
0
i . . . b
k−1
i , yi
]
P
[
bki = 0|b
0
i . . . , b
k−1
i , yi
] (12)
in a finite number of iterations, and the decision on the value of bki can finally made based on the sign
of λ(k,lmax)i . In practice, even when the Tanner graphs contain cycles, this belief-propagation algorithm
still performs well.
The only difference between Eq. (8)-(10) and the standard update rules belief propagation is the term
m
(k,0)
i , which takes into account not only the intrinsic information available from the observation yi,
but also from the decoding of the other levels p 6= k. Eq. (11) is similar to the update rule of a single-
input single-output (SISO) demodulator, however it should be noted that it involves the joint probability
p(y, xˆ) (and not the conditional probability p(y|xˆ)) to take into account the non-uniform distribution
of the symbols in X . In theory, it should be sufficient to decode each level only once, however in
practice performing several iterations between the levels might help improve the performance of the
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overall scheme. These practical issues will be discussed in the next section. Let us finally point out that
the algorithms described in [32], [33], [31] can all be viewed as special cases of this general algorithm.
B. Rate Assignment
The optimal code rates required for each sub-sequence {ℓk(xi)}i=0...n−1 are those required for Multi-
Stage Decoding. In fact, from the chain rule of entropy we have :
H(X|YM ) = H(ℓ0(X), . . . , ℓm−1(X)|YM ) =
∑
k
H(ℓk(X)|ℓ0(X), . . . , ℓk−1(X), YM ). (13)
Hence the H(X|YM ) bits per symbol required for reconciliation can be obtained by disclosing succes-
sively H(ℓk(X)|ℓ0(X), . . . , ℓk−1(X), YM ) bits per symbol. The optimal code rate required at each level
k is therefore :
Rkopt = 1−H(ℓk(X)|ℓ0(X), . . . , ℓk−1(X), YM ). (14)
Eq. (13) guarantees the optimality of the reconciliation scheme for any labeling, however the practical
efficiency of the reconciliation strongly depends on the mapping used. In fact the performance of the
reconciliation relies on our ability to construct capacity approaching codes for all levels k, which might
not be possible if the required rates are too low. We investigated several labeling strategies and found
out that the natural binary mapping was the best compromise. This mapping assigns to each symbol
xˆj ∈ X the m-bit representation of j + (2m − |X |)/2, and ℓk(xˆj) is then the kth label bit (ℓ0(xˆj) is the
least significant bit). Figure 4 shows the rates required for a constellation of size 10, with symbols and
probabilities given in table I, as a function of the signal to noise ratio 10 log10(1/NM ).
TABLE I
CONSTELLATION OPTIMIZED TO MAXIMIZE I(X;YM ) AT A SNR OF 13 DB.
xˆ -2.836 -2.320 -1.804 -1.289 -0.773 -0.258 0.258 0.773 1.289 1.804 2.320 2.836
P(xˆ) 0.0040 0.0146 0.0414 0.0904 0.1522 0.1974 0.1974 0.1522 0.0904 0.0414 0.0146 0.0040
ℓ0(xˆ) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ℓ1(xˆ) 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
ℓ2(xˆ) 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
ℓ3(xˆ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Over a wide range of SNRs, the optimal rates of the two uppermost levels are equal to 1, which greatly
simplifies code design by effectively requiring only two codes. We carried out extensive simulations,
11
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Fig. 4. Optimal code rates required for the constellation of table I
and observed that for any value of the SNR, adjusting the constellations size Nc so that H(X) ≈
0.5 log2(1 + SNR)+1 would require at most two codes while still maintaining I(X;YM ) within a few
hundredth of bits of its maximum value.
The natural mapping has the property of preserving the symmetry on the probability distribution of
the random variable X:
∀k ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} ,∀y ∈ R,∀xˆj ∈ X p(y, ℓk(xˆj)) = p(−y, ℓk(xˆj)⊕ 1). (15)
When first decoding the 0th level, this property implies that the equivalent channel seen by the bits
is output-symmetric and that these bits are also uniformly distributed. In this case the probability of
decoding error is the same for linear LDPC codes and LDPC coset codes, which allows us to use linear
LDPC codes designed with the standard density evolution method [34]. This property no more holds
when decoding the following levels, however recent results suggest that linear LDPC codes may still
perform well with our coset coding scheme [35]. In order to further simplify the code design, we used
irregular LDPC codes optimized for antipodal signaling over the AWGN channel as component codes.
The block length used was 200,000 and graphs were randomly generated while avoiding cycles of length
two and four. Despite this long block length, the perfomances of all constructed codes were still well
below those of their ideal capacity achieving counterparts, and perfect error-correction can therefore only
be achieved by using lower rates codes at each level. Cutting down the rate of all component codes would
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disclose far too many bits, however a careful choise of the code taking into account multiple iterations
between levels make it possible to maintain a good efficiency.
The practical code rate assignment is based on an analysis of the decoding process using EXIT
charts [36]. Although there exist no theoretical results associated with EXIT charts for the Gaussian
channel, they are a convenient tool to predict the exchange of information between the demappers
and decoders involved in an iterative decoding scheme, based on how much extrinsic information (IE)
they compute from a priori information (IA). There is no closed-form expression of the EXIT curve
IE = Td(IA) of the demapper characterized by Eq. (11) and of the LDPC EXIT curve IE = Tc(IA) for
100 iterations, however they can be obtained via Monte-Carlo simulations assuming Gaussian a priori
information [36]. Example of transfer curves are shown in Figure 5. We observed that low rate codes
gather extrinsic information at a slower pace than high-rate codes, therefore we decided to correct all
errors by reducing the rate of the highest-rate code and by using iterations between levels to compensate
for the poor performance of the lower rate code.
Let us now illustrate how code rates can be chosen on an example. We consider the situation where
the SNR is 13 dB, for which the optimal constellation is given in table I. One would in theory need two
ideal codes with rate 0.264 and 0.928. We used instead a code with rate 0.25 at the first level and looked
for a high rate code that would gather enough extrinsic information to start the decoding process and
correct all errors with an a priori information of 0.928. As shown in Fig. 5, a code with rate 0.86 was
a good compromise. It is interesting to note that despite the approximations made in the computation of
the EXIT curves, the real decoding trajectory is close to the expected behavior.
C. Efficiency results
The results obtained for various values of the noise variance are summarized in table II. For each SNR,
the size of the constellation X , the position of the constellation points and the probability distribution
were optimized according to the procedure described in section II, to ensure |I(X;YM )− CM | ≤
0.005 bits while limiting the number of required codes to two. Let us point out that our method achieves
good efficiency provided that two conditions are met. First, the constellation size required to maximize
I(X;YM ) should be |X | ≥ 4 so that two LDPC codes can be used. Second, the codes rates required
should not be too small so that we can construct good finite length codes. In practive this limited our
simulations to situations where the SNR was above 2 dB.
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Fig. 5. Iterative decoding trajectory averaged over 10 realizations.
TABLE II
EFFICIENCY RESULTS.
10 log
10
1
NM
|X | I(X;YM ) CM H(X) Optimal rates Practical rates Efficiency
2 dB 4 0.684 0.685 1.603 0.189/0.891 0.16/0.86 90.9%
7 dB 6 1.291 1.294 2.109 0.257/0.925/1 0.24/0.86/1 90.9%
10 dB 8 1.726 1.730 2.502 0.286/0.938/1 0.27/0.88/1 95.71%
13 dB 12 2.192 2.194 3.000 0.264/0.928/1/1 0.25/0.86/1/1 96.15%
20 dB 28 3.327 3.329 4.149 0.254/0.923/1/1/1 0.24/0.86/1/1/1 97.6%
IV. OPPORTUNISTIC SECURITY FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
This section describes an explicit secret key agreement protocol for wireless channels, exploiting the
reconciliation algorithm described earlier. The proposed scheme closely follows the general approach
presented in section II, however all steps are modified to take into account the specific nature of the
channels.
A. System Setup
We consider the wireless system depicted in Fig. 6. Bob and Eve respectively observe the symbols
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Fig. 6. Wireless system setup.
sent by Alice through discrete-time Rayleigh-fading channels given by
yM(i) = hM (i)x(i) + nM (i), (16)
yW (i) = hW (i)x(i) + nW (i), subject to E
{∣∣X(i)2∣∣} ≤ 1, (17)
where hM (i) (hW (i)) denotes the zero-mean fading coefficient of the main channel (wiretap channel), and
nM (i) (nW (i)) is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with variance NM (NW ). We further assume the
fading coefficients and the noises to be independent, and the fading coefficients to remain constant over the
transmission of several consecutive symbols (quasi-static fading). The instantaneous SNRs corresponding
to a single realization (hM , hW ) of the fading coefficients are denoted γM = |hM |2/NM and γW =
|hW |
2/NW , and the instantaneous capacities are then CM = log2(1 + γM ) and CW = log2(1 + γW ). As
shown in [37], the instantaneous secrecy capacity is
Cs =


CM −CW if γM > γW
0 if γM ≤ γW .
(18)
B. Secure Communication Protocol
The fluctuations of the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs with time suggest the following opportunistic
secret key agreement scheme (see also Fig. 7).
• Opportunistic transmissions. When the estimated instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs and the in-
stantaneous main channel capacity CM computed using the available CSI are greater than some
thresholds Cts ≥ 0 and CtM ≥ 0, Alice transmits random symbols at a rate equal to the capacity CM
using a Gaussian shaped Quadrature Amplitude Modulation scheme. We assume that Bob knows the
channel fading coefficient hM and detects coherently the symbols sent by Alice, hence the fading
15
channel can be viewed as two independent real Gaussian channels. The QAM constellation required
to send close to CM bits/symbols can therefore be obtained by replicating the PAM scheme decribed
in section II in two dimensions. This phase is called ”opportunistic transmission” since Alice and
Bob take advantage of the channel realizations where they know they can exchange more information
than Eve can intercept. The threshold CtM is imposed by the reconciliation method which fails below
a certain SNR, the choice of the threshold Cts will be discussed in the next section.
• Reconciliation and privacy amplification. When the estimated secrecy capacity or main channel
capacity fall below their respective theresholds, Alice and Bob extract a secure key from the shared
randomness previously obtained. The reconciliation algorithm described in section III allows Bob
to recover Alice’s symbols exactly, while limiting the additional information sent over the channel.
Privacy amplification with universal hash functions is then used to distill a secret key, taking into
account all the information leaked to Eve during the opportunistic transmission and reconciliation
stages.
• Secure communication. Alice and Bob can finally use their secret key to transmit messages, using
either a one-time pad to ensure perfect secrecy or any symmetric cypher.
LDPC-based
reconciliation
Amplification
Privacy
Amplification
Privacy
Alice Bob
Bit mapping
KK
YM,1, . . . , YM,n
Generate parities
X1, . . . , Xn
X1, . . . , XnX1, . . . , Xn
Reconciliation
(Cs < C
t
s or CM < C
t
M)
with K
Privacy amplification
Secure communication
Final key K
Transmission
(Cs ≥ C
t
s and CM ≥ C
t
M)
Fig. 7. Flowchart of the opportunistic protocol.
Notice that the randomness sharing and privacy amplification steps rely at this point on a perfect
estimation of the fading coefficients to calculate the instantaneous secrecy capacity and then correctly
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estimate the length of the secret key to distill. As we will see shortly, this assumption can be somewhat
alleviated to consider a more realistic situation where only imperfect CSI (or a conservative estimate) is
available for the wiretap channel.
V. RESULTS
A. Performance Measures for Information-Theoretically Secure Communications
The performance of the opportunitic protocol in the case of perfect channel state information will
be evaluated with the following two measures: average η-secure throughput Ts(η) and the average η-
communication throughput Tc(η) . The average η-secure throughput Ts(η) is defined as the average
number of secured message bits transmitted per channel use, where η is the ratio of secret-key bits used
per message bits (η ≤ 1). Note that in a secret key agreement scenario, the secret-key generation rate
does not contribute to the η-secured throughput since the key itself does not convey any information.
When η = 1, Ts(η) corresponds to a perfectly secure communication obtained with a one-time pad
encryption, whereas Ts(η) for η < 1 only represents an encrypted message rate with secret keys. If
ks is the key length required for encryption, the corresponding key renewal rate is ks/η. Similarily the
average η-communication throughput Tc(η) is defined as the average number of non-secure message
bits transmitted per channel use. In the case of secret-key agreement, the communication rate used for
reconciliation and privacy amplification has to be deduced from the total communication throughput.
Let us now evaluate Ts(η) for our protocol. Let D =
{
(γM , γW ) : Cs ≥ C
t
s, CM > C
t
M
}
be the set of
fading realizations for which an oportunistic transmission is performed and let D denote its complement in
R
2
+. For a given random variable X depending on the fading realization, let 〈X〉D denote its average over
all fading realizations in D. We will assume that fading coefficients remain constant over the transmission
of n≫ 2s+2+ r0 symbols, where s and r0 are the safety parameters used during privacy amplification.
We can then the neglect the penalty inflicted by privacy amplification and assume that the opportunistic
transmissions provide on average
〈βI(X;YW )− I(X;YW )〉D ≈ 〈βCM −CW 〉D (19)
secret key bits per symbol transmitted, which can then be used to secure
Ts(η) = η
−1〈βCM − CW 〉D (20)
bits of message per symbol. From section III, we know that reconciliation requires the transmission
of 〈H(X|YM ) + (1− β)I(X;YM )〉D ≈ 〈H(X) − βCM 〉D additional bits per symbols on average. The
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minimum size of a universal familiy of hash functions G : {0, 1}nrec → {0, 1}k is at least 2nrec−k [38]
and privacy amplication therefore requires the transmission of nrec−k bits. No hashing scheme is known
to achieve this bound for any nrec, therefore we will consider the more realistic situation where privacy
amplification requires the transmission of nrec bits. For instance, this can be achieved with the following
family [26]:
HGF(2nrec )→{0,1}nkey = {hc : c ∈ GF(2
nrec)} , (21)
where hc(x) is defined as nkey distinct bits of the product cx in a polynomial representation of GF(2nrec).
Finally, since the maximum number of non-secure bits transmitted is at most the capacity of the main
channel, we obtain:
Tc(η) = 〈CM 〉D − 〈H(X) − βCM 〉D − 〈H(X)〉D − η
−1〈βCM − CW 〉D. (22)
Notice that Tc(η) may be negative when P(Cs ≥ Cts) ≫ P(Cs < Cst ). This situation corresponds to a
regime where Alice and Bob generate keys faster than they use them, which can be avoided by adjusting
the parameter Ct so that Tc(η) remains positive. In the remaining of the paper, we will be interested in the
ultimate performance of the protocol, therefore according to section III we will assume H(X) ≈ CM +2
but unless otherwise specified we will use CtM = 0 and β = 1.
The maximum average secure throughput for η = 1 achievable by the opportunistic protocol is shown
Fig. 8. As expected the protocol is in general sub-optimal since most of the main channel capacity has to
be sacrificed for key agreement. Interestingly when the wiretap channel average SNR γW is well above
the main channel average SNR γM , all the additional communication required for reconciliation and
privacy amplification as well as the communication secured by a one-time pad, can be performed when
the secrecy capacity is zero. In this case, the protocol incurs no loss of secure communication rate.
Fig. 9 shows the secure throughputs obtained for different values of η. Strictly speaking, the protocol
does not provide any information theoretic security in this regime, since the keys generated are used to
encode several bits. Nevertheless, this result shows that the protocol provides an efficient and potentially
fast way of exchanging information-theoretically secure keys. In this mode of operation, it could be
tailored with standard secure encryption algorithms (such as the AES with 192 bits) to strenghten the
current level of security of wireless communications.
B. Mitigating the Effects of Imperfect CSI
Let us now briefly discuss the impact of imperfect channel state information. We can reasonably assume
that Bob cooperates with Alice, which allows her to obtain a perfect estimate of the main channel fading
18
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coefficient. Unfortunately Eve may not be as helpful and Alice’s knowledge of the wiretap fading is more
likely to be noisy. In order to assess the performance of our protocol under more realistic conditions,
we model Alice’s estimate of Eve’s fading coefficient by hˆW = hW + nW , where hW is the true fading
coefficient and nW is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with known variance σ2 per dimension. If
Alice applies the previous protocol blindly, her estimation Cˆs of the instantaneous secrecy capacity will
generally differ from the real secrecy capacity Cs. The situations where Cˆs ≤ Cs do not impact the
secrecy of the key agreement, however when Cˆs > Cs, Alice understimates the information leaked to
the eavesdropper and subsequently generate keys whose entropy is not maximum. Let Kˆ denote the
kˆ-bit key generated by Alice based on her estimation Cˆs. From theorem 1, the uncertainty on Kˆ of the
eavesdropper is bounded as follows:
kˆ ≥ H(kˆ|G,E = e) ≥ kˆ −
2n(CW−CˆW )−r0
ln 2
= kˆ −
2n(CW−CˆW−α)
ln 2
, (23)
where we have introduced the parameter α = r0/n. As long as CW −CˆW ≤ α, the uncertainty of the key
Kˆ lies within 1.5 bits of its maximal value and can be regarded as secret, however when CW − CˆW > α
the lower bound on H(Kˆ|G,E = e) decreases exponentially in the difference CW − CˆW − α.
The introduction of imperfect CSI and the use of the parameter α slightly modify the expression of
the average secure and communication given by Eq. (20) and (22). Let D =
{
( ˆγM , γW ) : Cˆs ≥ C
t
s
}
,
then
Ts(η) = η
−1〈Cˆs − α〉D (24)
Tc(η) = 〈CM 〉D − 〈H(X)− CM 〉D − 〈H(X)〉D − η
−1〈Cˆs − α〉D. (25)
The threshold Cts ≥ α should once more be chosen such that Tc(η) ≥ 0. Contrary to the situation where
perfect CSI is available, the average secure throughput defined above is not sufficient to characterize
the security of the system. In fact it only represents Alice’s targeted secure communication rate, which
might be different from the true secure communication rate. Hence we need to introduce the true average
secure throughput Rs and the average leaked throughput Rl defined as:
Rs = η
−1〈Cˆs − α〉Ds , (26)
Rc = η
−1〈Cˆs − α〉Dl , (27)
where Ds =
{
( ˆγM , γW ) : Cˆs ≥ C
t
s, Cˆs − Cs ≤ α
}
and Dl =
{
(γˆM , γW ) : Cˆs ≥ C
t
s, Cˆs − Cs > α
}
.
These expressions cannot be computed in close form but can be obtained with Monte-Carlo simulations.
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Figure 10 shows the results obtained for an estimation noise variance of σ2 = 10 and σ2 = 0.0001 when
η = 1 and α = 0 (i.e. the safety parameter r0 ≪ n).
Interestingly when Alice has a bad estimation of the wiretap channel fading coefficient and if the
main channel SNR is well above the wiretap channel SNR, most of the keys generated are still secret.
This unexpected behavior can be explained by the asymmetry of the distribution p(γˆW |γW ) which forces
Alice to undersestimate CW most of the time. On the other hand when her estimations of the wiretap CSI
improves, she becomes equally likely to overstimate or understimate CW , therefore Rc ≈ Rs and half
of the keys generated are then insecure. The impact of imperfect of imperfect channel state information
can be somewhat mitigated by increasing the parameter α. In fact, α > 0 plays the role of a safety
margin and reduces the length of the generated keys. By increasing α, the average leaked throughput can
be made arbitrarily small, but this also decreases the achievable secure throughput. Figure 11 shows the
results obtained for α = 0.1. When σ2 = 0.0001, the secure throughput loss is negligible, however this
slight increase in α suffices to ensure the secrecy of the keys generated. The mitigation is less effective
when σ2 = 10, and a further increase of α would be necessary to reduce the leaked throughput.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In the second of this two-part paper on wireless information-theoretic security, we proposed a protocol
based on one-way communications providing secure communication over quasi-static wireless channels.
This scheme opportunistically exploits the fluctuations of the fading coefficients to exchange information-
theoretially secure keys, which are then be used to encrypt messages. We analysed the security provided
by the protocol in the idealized case where the channel state information of the wiretap channel is known,
but also showed that secure communication is still achievable in the more realistic situation where only
imperfect channel state information is available. The fundamental security limits in both scenarios were
studied in Part I.
The performance and complexity of the proposed scheme mainly rely on those of the reconciliation
algorithm. Our LDPC-based reconciliation method is near-optimal over a wide range of signal-to noise
ratios, however the memory requirements and the complexity may still be too high for embedded or
low-cost systems. In future work, we will investigate new code constructions to in order to reduce the
hardware requirements while still maintaining the same level of performance.
22
Let us finally mention that even though the encryption used in our scheme could be performed with
a one-time pad to ensure perfect security, the protocol may be of higher interest if tailored with existing
secret-key encryption methods (e.g. DES, AES) to strenghten their current level of security.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Bloch, A. Thangaraj, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “LDPC-based secret key agreement over the gaussian
wiretap channel,” in Proc. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Seattle, USA, 2006.
[2] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues, and S. W. McLaughlin, “An opportunistic physical-layer approach to secure
wireless communications,” in Proc. 44th Allerton conference on Communication Control and Computing, Allerton, USA,
September 2006.
[3] ——, “LDPC-based secure wireless communication with imperfect knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel,” in Proc.
IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Chengdu, China, October 2006.
[4] J. Forney, G.D. and G. Ungerboeck, “Modulation and coding for linear gaussian channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 44, no. 6, pp. 2384–2415, Oct. 1998.
[5] E. Biglieri, J. Proakis, and S. Shamai, “Fading channels: information-theoretic and communications aspects,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 44, no. 6, pp. 2619–2692, Oct. 1998.
[6] A. D. Wyner, “The Wire-Tap Channel,” The Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1367, October 1975.
[7] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner, “Wire Tap Channel II,” AT&T Bell Laboratories Technical Journal, vol. 63, no. 10, pp.
2135–2157, December 1984.
[8] V. Wei, “Generalized hamming weights for linear codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 37, no. 5, pp.
1412–1418, Sept. 1991.
[9] A. Thangaraj, S. Dihidar, A. R. Calderbank, S. W. McLaughlin, and J.-M. Merolla, “On novel applications of ldpc codes
to the wiretap channel,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. on Inf. Theory, 2006.
[10] M. Hayashi, “Exponents of channel resolvability and wire-tapped channel,” in Proc. ISITA, 2004, pp. 1080–1085.
[11] ——, “General nonasymptotic and asymptotic formulas in channel resolvability and identification capacity and their
application to the wiretap channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 1562–1575, April
2006.
[12] J. Muramatsu, “Secret key agreement from correlated source outputs using low density parity check matrices,” IEICE
Trans. on Fund. of Elec. Comm. Comp., vol. E89-A, no. 7, pp. 2036–2046, July 2006.
[13] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742, May 1993.
[14] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Unconditionally Secure Key Agreement and Intrinsic Conditional Information,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 499–514, March 1999.
[15] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “Common randomness in information theory and cryptography. i. secret sharing,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, July 1993.
[16] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, and U. Maurer, “Generalized Privacy Amplification,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 1915–1923, 1995.
[17] G. Van Assche, J. Cardinal, and N. J. Cerf, “Reconciliation of a Quantum-Distributed Gaussian Key,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 394–400, February 2004.
23
[18] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian Wire-Tap Channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, July 1978.
[19] H. Chabanne and G. Fumaroli, “Noisy cryptographic protocols for low-cost rfid tags,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 3562–3566, Aug. 2006.
[20] N. Varnica, X. Ma, and A. Kavcic, “Capacity of power constrained memoryless awgn channels with fixed input
constellations,” in Global Telecommunications Conference, vol. 2, 17-21 Nov. 2002, pp. 1339–1343vol.2.
[21] G. Brassard and L. Salvail, “Secret-key Reconciliation by Public Discussion,” in Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt’93,
T. Helleseth, Ed. Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 411–423.
[22] D. Slepian and J. K. Wolf, “Noiseless Coding of Correlated Information Sources,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 471–480, July 1973.
[23] J. L. Carter and M. N. Wegman, “Universal classes of hash functions,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 18,
pp. 143–154, 1979.
[24] C. Cachin and U. M. Maurer, “Linking Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification,” Journal of Cryptology,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 97–110, March 1997.
[25] U. M. Maurer and S. Wolf, “Information-Theoretic Key Agreement: From Weak to Strong Secrecy for Free,” in Advances
in Cryptology - Eurocrypt 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. B. Preneel, 2000, p. 351.
[26] M. N. Wegman and J. Carter, “New hash functions and their use in authentication and set equality,” Journal of Computer
Sciences and Systems, vol. 22, pp. 265–279, 1981.
[27] W. T. Buttler, S. K. Lamoreaux, J. R. Torgerson, G. H. Nickel, C. H. Donahue, and C. G. Peterson, “Fast, efficient error
reconciliation for quantum cryptography,” Physical Review A, vol. 67, no. 5, pp. 052 303/1–8, May 2003.
[28] A. Wyner, “Recent results in the shannon theory,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 2–10, Jan
1974.
[29] G. Caire, G. Taricco, and E. Biglieri, “Bit-interleaved Coded Modulation,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 927–946, May 1998.
[30] U. Wachsmann, R. F. H. Fischer, and J. B. Huber, “Multilevel Codes: Theoretical Concepts and Practical Design Rules,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 1361–1391, July 1999.
[31] A. D. Liveris, Z. Xiong, and C. N. Georghiades, “Compression of Binary Sources With Side Information at the Decoder
Using LDPC Codes,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 6, no. 10, pp. 440–442, October 2002.
[32] Y. Nana, E. Sharon, and S. Litsyn, “Improved decoding of ldpc coded modulations,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 10,
no. 5, pp. 375–377, May 2006.
[33] J. Chen, D. ke He, and A. Jagmohan, “Slepian-wolf code design via source-channel correspondence,” in Proc. IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory, Seattle, WA, July 2006.
[34] T. J. Richardson, M. A. Shokrollahi, and R. L. Urbanke, “Design of Capacity-Approaching Irregular Low-Density Parity-
Check Codes,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 619–637, February 2001.
[35] C.-C. Wang, S. Kulkarni, and H. Poor, “On the typicality of the linear code among the ldpc coset code ensemble,” in Proc.
of the 39th Conference on Information Sciences and Systems, Baltimore, USA, March 2005.
[36] S. ten Brink, “Convergence Behavior of Iteratively Decoded Parallel Concatenated Codes,” IEEE Trans. Comm., vol. 49,
no. 10, pp. 1727–1737, October 2001.
[37] J. Barros and M. R. D. Rodrigues, “Secrecy capacity of wireless channels,” in Proc. IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, Seattle, USA, 2006.
24
[38] D. R. Stinson, “Universal hashing and authentication codes,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 576, pp. 74–85,
1991.
25
